By Jessica Brown
Modern philosophy of brain is ruled via anti- individualism, which holds subject's ideas are made up our minds not just by way of what's inside of her head but in addition by means of elements of her surroundings. regardless of its dominance, anti-individualism is topic to a frightening array of epistemological objections: that it's incompatible with the privileged entry every one topic has to her innovations, that it undermines rationality, and, absurdly, that it presents a brand new path to a priori wisdom of the realm. during this rigorous and persuasive research, Jessica Brown defends anti- individualism from those epistemological objections. The dialogue has vital outcomes for key epistemological concerns similar to skepticism, closure, transmission, and the character of data and warrant. in line with Brown's research, one major reason behind pondering that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged entry is that it undermines a subject's introspective skill to tell apart forms of concepts. So clinically determined, the traditional specialise in a subject's reliability approximately her suggestions offers no enough answer. Brown defuses the objection by means of entice the epistemological thought of a appropriate substitute. extra, she argues that, given a formal figuring out of rationality, anti- individualism is appropriate with the inspiration that we're rational matters. although, the dialogue of rationality offers a brand new argument that anti-individualism is in rigidity with Fregean feel. eventually, Brown indicates that anti-individualism doesn't create a brand new path to a priori wisdom of the realm. whereas rejecting suggestions that limit the transmission of warrant, she argues that anti-individualists should still deny that we've got the kind of wisdom that will be required to exploit a priori wisdom of suggestion content material to achieve a priori wisdom of the realm.
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Extra info for Anti-Individualism and Knowledge
Instead, I use my general knowledge of your political views gained in the past using behavioral evidence. By contrast, a subject can know what she herself thinks without basing this on evidence about her own behavior, whether past or present. For example, I can know that I believe that today is Tuesday 34 Chapter 2 without ﬁrst observing my behavior, say, hearing myself say ‘Today is Tuesday’, or noticing myself go about the activities in my diary for Tuesday. Indeed, I can know that I have this belief without evidencing it in my behavior at all (perhaps, I have only just woken up).
As a result, Burge’s thought experiment applies to a much wider range of terms—terms for natural kinds, and terms for other kinds, as well as verbs, abstract nouns, adjectives, and so on (Burge 1979, p. 79). Burge’s attribution of the concept tharthritis to the subject in the counterfactual situation is relatively uncontroversial. After all, everything seems to point to Sally’s having this Anti-Individualism 19 concept—both the way she would explicate the term herself and her community’s linguistic practice.
Suppose that she visits her doctor and says, ‘I’m afraid that my arthritis has spread to my thigh’. The doctor reassures Sally, saying that, by deﬁnition, arthritis cannot occur in thighs. It seems likely that Sally would respond with relief, regarding her earlier fear as false, and would go on to ask what might be wrong with her thigh. This response suggests that it is the public concept arthritis that ﬁgures in her belief, not some idiosyncratic concept deﬁned by her own views. If, as Burge suggests, her belief involves the concept arthritis, then her belief is indeed false as a matter of the deﬁnition of the concept.