By Stephen Hetherington
A few key points of up to date epistemology should be challenged, and How to Know does simply that. This publication argues that numerous long-standing presumptions on the center of the traditional analytic notion of data are fake, and defends an alternate, a practicalist belief of knowledge.
- Presents a philosophically unique perception of data, at odds with a few significant tenets of analytic epistemology
- Offers a dissolution of epistemology’s notorious Gettier challenge — explaining why the meant challenge was once by no means fairly an issue within the first place.
- Defends an unorthodox notion of the connection among knowledge-that and knowledge-how, realizing knowledge-that as a kind of knowledge-how.
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Extra info for How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge
It depends upon the extent to which an exercise of blind obedience to a rule can nonetheless be an intelligent action manifesting knowledge-that. 4 The Knowledge-as-Ability Hypothesis The debate continues, then. And now I will complicate it somewhat. If Ryle is right, knowledge-how can be manifested without involvement by knowledge-that. 13 If Stanley and Williamson are right, Ryle is not — and maybe Wittgenstein is not quite so. Are the conceptual options thereby exhausted? They are not. 14 We may call this a practicalism about knowledge-that (such an approach being the converse of what Ryle called an intellectualism about knowledge-how).
Now we should notice another possible core problem — a theoreticalism problem. This one concerns the standard epistemological emphasis upon trying first and foremost to understand propositional knowledge, as against other sorts of knowledge. 5’s knowledge-that-as-fundamentallytheoretical-knowledge thesis is now to be considered — with knowledge being assumed to take a theoretical form, not a practical form. Do epistemologists know that knowledge-that is definitively theoretical, not practical? The worry behind this question is that, in the absence of real knowledge of the claimed categorial difference between propositional knowledge and knowledge-how, the usual epistemological insistence upon there being such a categorial boundary could well be leading us fundamentally astray in our attempts to ascertain even propositional knowledge’s key constitutive and distinguishing characteristics.
Epistemologists do not talk in that way about what it is to know that p. Instead, their usual locutions treat each instance of propositional knowledge as being a state from which those skills may flow. One would have the knowledge that p by (1) having various pertinent properties and thus by (2) some apposite state of affairs (the knowledge-state) obtaining — with (1) and (2) being so in ways that would not depend upon the prior or simultaneous presence of those other abilities mentioned in K. These abilities would be present, if at all, only as a conceptually separable consequence of the knowledge’s presence.