By Ruth Millikan
Starting with a basic thought of functionality utilized to physique organs, behaviors, customs, and either internal and outer representations, Ruth Millikan argues that the intentionality of language might be defined irrespective of speaker intentions and that an figuring out of the intentionality of concept can and may be divorced from the matter of knowing awareness. the consequences aid a realist concept of fact and of universals, and open the best way for a nonfoundationalist and nonholistic method of epistemology.Ruth Millikan is affiliate Professor of Philosophy on the college of Connecticut at Storrs. A Bradford ebook.
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Extra resources for Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
In addition to the question of how the theory can do justice to the causal element in perception, it faces a problem in accounting for hallucinations in which there is no object to appear to the person at all. I could, after all, hallucinate a green field when I see nothing physical at all, say because it is pitch dark or my eyes are closed. In such an empty hallucination – one that Perception 33 occurs despite my perceiving nothing – what is it that appears green to me? There is a plausible answer, but it is associated with a quite different theory of perception.
Second, suppose that seeing the bird did imply (visually) seeing it as something. Clearly, this need not be something one is justified in believing it to be (and perhaps it need not be something one does believe it to be). Charles might erroneously see a plainly black bird as blue, simply because he so loves birds of blue color and so dislikes black birds that (as he himself knows) his vision plays tricks on him when he is bird-watching. He might then not be justified in believing that the bird is blue.
It is true that when we see something, we see it by seeing some property or aspect of it; but it does not follow that we see it as having this property or aspect. I might see a van Gogh painting by its distinctive brush strokes, but not see it as having them because my visual experience is dominated by the painting as a whole. Someone might reply that if I see it by those strokes, I am disposed to believe it has them and so must see it as having them; but this disposition implies at most a capacity to see it as having them.