Posted by 
By George Powell
Read or Download Language, Thought and Reference PDF
Similar consciousness & thought books
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts
We're fabric beings in a cloth international, yet we're additionally beings who've stories and emotions. How can those subjective states be only a subject of subject? To shield materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what's also known as "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we own more than a few targeted strategies for classifying the subjective elements of our stories.
Content, Consciousness, and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind
What kind of factor is the brain? and the way can any such factor whilst - belong to the flora and fauna, - characterize the realm, - provide upward thrust to our subjective adventure, - and flooring human wisdom? content material, recognition and belief is an edited assortment, comprising 11 new contributions to the philosophy of brain, written through essentially the most promising younger philosophers within the united kingdom and eire.
Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives
Realization may be the main complicated challenge we people face in attempting to comprehend ourselves. the following, eighteen essays provide new angles at the topic. The participants, who contain a few of the major figures in philosophy of brain, speak about such important issues as intentionality, out of the ordinary content material, and the relevance of quantum mechanics to the examine of cognizance.
- Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation
- Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis
- Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World
- Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry
Additional info for Language, Thought and Reference
Sample text
8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 31 may do so, and, when it does, ‘now’ will correspond to a particular type of individual concept. See the discussion of indexicals in Chapter 4. Whether the truth-conditionalist has to take this position has been the subject of a certain amount of debate recently. Some, such as Cappelen and Lepore (2005), argue that it’s possible to accept that pragmatic inference plays a central role in, for instance, assigning reference to indexicals, without thereby undermining the truth-conditional project.
The importance of speaker intuition lies at the heart of the radical pragmatics/minimal semantics face-off. In broad terms, the difference is this: the radical pragmatist takes intuitions on what is said by an utterance at more or less face value, whereas the minimal semanticist views such intuitions with deep suspicion. The minimal semanticist has a problem however: suspicious as she may be about speaker intuitions, she can’t do away with them entirely on pain of sacrificing any claim her theory might have to empirical significance.
On this view, the output of the language module is standardly (if not invariably) sub-propositional, viewed as something like a proposition schema. This schema will provide just one type of input to the inferential processes involved in forming and confirming hypotheses concerning speaker intentions. Over the last few years, something of an industry has grown up in defending truth-based approaches to meaning against this kind of contextualism. 12 Firstly, is there a substantive disagreement here?