By Maite Ezcurida, Robert J. Stainton, Christopher Viger
This quantity comprises fourteen essays discussing fresh concerns within the philosophy of language and the philosophy of brain. the gathering is prepared into 3 sections: one on language, one at the intersection of language and brain, and a last part on brain. the subjects comprise the context-sensitivity of semantics, anaphora, right names, the character of realizing, folks psychology and the speculation of brain, self-awareness, the constitution of the human brain and the level to which it truly is modular, between others.
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Extra info for New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind (Canadian Journal of Philosophy)
There are no obvious or a priori limits on the different variations on giraffe-tallness. Just to remind you why this matters: We're imagining a Semantic Contextualist opponent who's completely baffled by the idea that there's such a thing as tallness and that it can be the semantic value of 'tall'. We've just tried to make that seem a little less peculiar, by showing that the kind of worry that triggers befuddlement with respect to being tall should also, if legitimate, trigger the same sort of befuddlement with respect to being tall for a giraffe.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how, on any account of salience, such an entity could be salient in a context. Certainly neither it, nor instances of it, could be perceptually present in the context. It is equally difficult to see how speaker intentions could determine reference to such an entity. (2000, 414) But this seems an odd way of construing the proposal of the proponent of unarticulated constituents. Surely the view would be, roughly, that the character of an expression like "rains", which induces an unarticulated constituent has an argument place which elicits a value from context and which, in constructions such as (8), can also have its interpretation governed by an operator elsewhere in the sentence.
Stanley distinguishes between narrow indexicals and unarticulated constituents. ' The three central features of such words is, first, that they are primitive lexical items, second, that they are not bindable by operators, and, third, that their interpretation shifts from context to context. (2000, 411) Here Stanley simply builds unbindability into the definition of 'narrow indexicals'. If Stanley intends narrow indexicals to exhaust the contribution of context via character to content, then he here presupposes the truth of the NBP.