By Bill Brewer
Invoice Brewer provides an unique view of the position of awake adventure within the acquisition of empirical wisdom. He argues that perceptual reviews needs to supply purposes for empirical ideals if there are to be any determinate ideals in any respect approximately specific gadgets on the planet. This clean method of epistemology turns clear of the hunt for worthwhile and adequate stipulations for wisdom and works as a substitute from a idea of realizing in a selected zone.
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Additional info for Perception and Reason
I have recently defended the move from (2) and (8) to (9). 1) for my premise (P1); and the core of that premise, (11), follows directly from (10). (1) Reference to spatial particulars is possible. (2) Consider a person, S, with a perceptually based belief about a particular mindindependent thing, a. (3) S knows that he is referring to a. (4) Suppose for reductio that S's Idea of a is purely descriptive, constituted wholly by the general description, ‘the F’. (5) Multiple satisfaction with respect to ‘F’ is an epistemic possibility for S.
44 even though she may point to an object and mouth the word ‘that’, and even though she may thereby be taken by others—especially those unaware of her blindsight condition— to be expressing a thought about that object, she has absolutely no idea which object is in question, and therefore has no Idea of that particular object. So she is incapable of genuinely understanding any content which refers to that thing rather than anything else. She is therefore incapable of making reference to it in genuine belief.
Hence the move from perceptual demonstrative reference to essentially experiential reference is valid. Bringing the whole of this discussion together, here is a relatively formal presentation of my argument for premise (P1), above, that there is a class of beliefs about the spatial world, E, whose members have the contents which they do—that a particular mindindependent thing is determinately thus and so—only in virtue of their standing in certain relations with various actual or possible perceptual experiences.