By Professor Bradley Armour-Garb, Professor James A. Woodbridge
During this publication, Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge distinguish numerous species of fictionalism, finding and protecting their very own model of philosophical fictionalism. Addressing semantic and philosophical puzzles that come up from usual language, they think about such matters because the challenge of non-being, plural identification claims, mental-attitude ascriptions, which means attributions, and truth-talk. they give thought to 'deflationism approximately truth', explaining why deflationists may be fictionalists, and convey how their philosophical fictionalist account of truth-talk underwrites a dissolution of the Liar Paradox and its family members. They additional discover the semantic notions of reference and predicate-satisfaction, exhibiting how philosophical fictionalism may also unravel puzzles that those notions seem to current. Their serious exam of fictionalist methods in philosophy, including the improvement and alertness in their personal model of philosophical fictionalism, can be of serious curiosity to students and upper-level scholars of philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophical common sense, philosophy of brain, epistemology, and linguistics
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Extra info for Pretense and pathology : philosophical fictionalism and its applications
Searle (1975), p. 330. 5 From comparative ﬁctionalism to philosophical ﬁctionalism 21 that a face-value reading would take them to be about). 62 This account thus qualiﬁes as a philosophical ﬁctionalist account of speciﬁcally metaﬁctive discourse. Before turning to Searle’s “realist” account of transﬁctive discourse, it is useful to point out the similarities and differences of Thomasson’s “realist” philosophy of ﬁction. 63 However, she offers more details about what this involves (abstract cultural artifacts) and pays more attention to various concerns about such a proposal (for example, how we can refer to ﬁctional characters, identity conditions for ﬁctional characters, and so forth).
See Thomasson (1999), p. 106. 69 Schiffer (2003), p. 71. Cf. Schiffer (1996), pp. 149–150. See Kripke (1973). Schiffer (1996), pp. 155–157. Cf. Schiffer (2003), pp. 51–52. 5 From comparative ﬁctionalism to philosophical ﬁctionalism 23 element of his philosophy of ﬁction. As a result, Schiffer’s account does not qualify as philosophical ﬁctionalism (or even as ﬁctionalism at all), in spite of being modeled on a philosophy of ﬁction that is partly philosophical ﬁctionalist. To see how using Thomasson’s philosophy of ﬁction plays out in a view that even self-identiﬁes as ﬁctionalist, consider again the account of mathematics that Bueno offers.
Which allow for substitution into any schematic variables enclosed) or preceded by ‘that’. , pp. 262–263. 80 So, for example, because a metaﬁctive claim like (6) There is a brilliant detective at 221b Baker Street. is, on Lewis’s account, really just an abbreviation for (7) According to the Holmes stories, there is a brilliant detective at 221b Baker Street. (6) is about the same thing that (7) is about and thus is a claim about what the Holmes stories portray. 81 In fact, we think that genuine semantic competence with metaﬁctive sentences requires that one understand that they are about the content (and consequences) of a work of ﬁction.