Download Pretense and pathology : philosophical fictionalism and its by Professor Bradley Armour-Garb, Professor James A. Woodbridge PDF

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By Professor Bradley Armour-Garb, Professor James A. Woodbridge

During this publication, Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge distinguish numerous species of fictionalism, finding and protecting their very own model of philosophical fictionalism. Addressing semantic and philosophical puzzles that come up from usual language, they think about such matters because the challenge of non-being, plural identification claims, mental-attitude ascriptions, which means attributions, and truth-talk. they give thought to 'deflationism approximately truth', explaining why deflationists may be fictionalists, and convey how their philosophical fictionalist account of truth-talk underwrites a dissolution of the Liar Paradox and its family members. They additional discover the semantic notions of reference and predicate-satisfaction, exhibiting how philosophical fictionalism may also unravel puzzles that those notions seem to current. Their serious exam of fictionalist methods in philosophy, including the improvement and alertness in their personal model of philosophical fictionalism, can be of serious curiosity to students and upper-level scholars of philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophical common sense, philosophy of brain, epistemology, and linguistics

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Searle (1975), p. 330. 5 From comparative fictionalism to philosophical fictionalism 21 that a face-value reading would take them to be about). 62 This account thus qualifies as a philosophical fictionalist account of specifically metafictive discourse. Before turning to Searle’s “realist” account of transfictive discourse, it is useful to point out the similarities and differences of Thomasson’s “realist” philosophy of fiction. 63 However, she offers more details about what this involves (abstract cultural artifacts) and pays more attention to various concerns about such a proposal (for example, how we can refer to fictional characters, identity conditions for fictional characters, and so forth).

See Thomasson (1999), p. 106. 69 Schiffer (2003), p. 71. Cf. Schiffer (1996), pp. 149–150. See Kripke (1973[2013]). Schiffer (1996), pp. 155–157. Cf. Schiffer (2003), pp. 51–52. 5 From comparative fictionalism to philosophical fictionalism 23 element of his philosophy of fiction. As a result, Schiffer’s account does not qualify as philosophical fictionalism (or even as fictionalism at all), in spite of being modeled on a philosophy of fiction that is partly philosophical fictionalist. To see how using Thomasson’s philosophy of fiction plays out in a view that even self-identifies as fictionalist, consider again the account of mathematics that Bueno offers.

Which allow for substitution into any schematic variables enclosed) or preceded by ‘that’. , pp. 262–263. 80 So, for example, because a metafictive claim like (6) There is a brilliant detective at 221b Baker Street. is, on Lewis’s account, really just an abbreviation for (7) According to the Holmes stories, there is a brilliant detective at 221b Baker Street. (6) is about the same thing that (7) is about and thus is a claim about what the Holmes stories portray. 81 In fact, we think that genuine semantic competence with metafictive sentences requires that one understand that they are about the content (and consequences) of a work of fiction.

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