By John Zeimbekis, Athanassios Raftopoulos
Based on the cognitive penetrability speculation, our ideals, wishes, and doubtless our feelings actually have an effect on how we see the area. This e-book elucidates the character of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical results. It connects the topic's a number of strands (the mental findings, computationalist historical past, epistemological outcomes of cognitive structure, and up to date philosophical advancements) at a time while the end result of many philosophical debates relies on figuring out even if and the way cognitive states can impression belief. All 16 chapters have been written in particular for the publication. the 1st chapters offer methodological and conceptual rationalization of the subject and provides an account of the kinfolk among penetrability, encapsulation, modularity, and cross-modal interactions in notion. tests of mental and neuroscientific facts for cognitive penetration are given through numerous chapters. many of the contributions examine the influence of cognitive penetrability and impenetrability on particular philosophical subject matters: high-level perceptual contents, the epistemological outcomes of penetration, nonconceptual content material, the phenomenology of overdue notion, metacognitive emotions, and motion. The e-book contains a entire creation and is the reason the historical past of the controversy, its key technical recommendations (informational encapsulation, early and past due imaginative and prescient, the perception-cognition contrast, hard-wired perceptual processing, perceptual studying, theory-ladenness), and the debate's relevance to present themes within the philosophy of brain and belief, epistemology, and philosophy of psychology.
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Extra resources for The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives
To understand the shape of the current debate, we have first to explain some of the background literature on attention. But two distinctions concerning attention are particularly important for the penetrability debate: the difference between exogenous and endogenous attention, and the difference between the ‘spotlight’ and the ‘biased competition’ views of attention. Endogenous effects on early visual processing would amount to CP, while exogenous effects can be compatible with impenetrability of the visual processes in which they are involved.
If the contents of perception are counterfactually dependent on causal cognitive influences, then it seems that low-level contents result from classification and that there is continuity between perception and cognition after all. This imaginary scenario is then applied to Siegel’s (2006; 2010) main contrast case, in which Siegel claims that acquiring the recognitional concept for pine trees alters the visual experience caused by pine trees. To deny this premise of the thought experiment, the defender of high-level content would have to commit herself to the unlikely view that if you don’t possess the concept, then you cannot visually experience certain shapes and colours.
9 To summarize, two conditions were defined for the cognitive penetrability of perception in the original computationalist framework: (1) the perceptual system draws on the informational resources of a cognitive system to perform its computations (the vehicle condition); (2) it generates output representations that it would not generate if it did not Page 30 of 60 The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception draw on the cognitive resources, and those representations stand in a relation of semantic coherence to the penetrating informational resources (the content condition).