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He takes this aim seriously. I think we can muster something in defense of the above thesis along the following lines. The line of argument I am going to exploit draw on Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation (Davidson 1984). According to Davidson, an adequate semantic theory for a language should be such that if one comes to know the theory, one would partially understand the language. He thinks that a Tarski-style truth theory is the appropriate form for such a theory of meaning so that for each sentence (s) of object language (L), the theory should deliver a meaninggiving theorem of the form (T): s is true (in L) iff p, where p is the translation of the object-language sentence into the meta-language.

We shall call such sentences “Moorean sentences”. There thus appears to be something odd or defective about them, and the question that has caught the attention of philosophers ever since is to explain what underlies their defective nature. There have been numerous responses to this question. Despite differing over details, all the attempted resolutions of Moore’s paradox tend to see the absurdity of Moorean sentences as eventually stemming, one way or another, from the violation of the law of non-contradiction although such sentences seem to differ clearly from outright contradictions of the form


137). The principle of charity, thus, demands that we assume, for example, that the speakers believe that it is raining when raining in their vicinity. It requires us, in other words, to assume that people believe the obvious (by our lights), that is, believe what we, the interpreters, regard as obvious or regard as true. For our purposes here, we may simplify the situation by ignoring the interpreter/interpretee divide since, as both Quine and Davidson have emphasized, charity begins at home. The interpreter’s beliefs are as much subject to the constraint of charity as are the beliefs of the interpretee.

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