By Jason Baehr
This ebook is the 1st systematic therapy of 'responsibilist' or character-based advantage epistemology, an method of epistemology that specializes in highbrow personality virtues like open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, inquisitiveness, and highbrow braveness, rigor, and carefulness. Baehr distinguishes 4 major types of character-based advantage epistemology and develops a entire evaluation of every. for college students philosophers searching for an creation to this interesting new box, the booklet deals a quick heritage of advantage epistemology, an summary of latest learn within the box, and an advent to highbrow virtues that distinguishes them from highbrow abilities, temperaments, schools, and abilities. For experts in epistemology, it offers such a lot intensive exam so far of the function that the concept that of highbrow advantage may possibly play in a philosophical account of information. Baehr additionally argues for increasing the borders of epistemology right to incorporate a extra speedy quandary with highbrow virtues and their function in a very good highbrow existence. For advantage theorists and ethical psychologists, the e-book includes a close safety of a 'personal worthy' account of the character and constitution of an highbrow advantage and situates this account vis-ï¿½-vis the perspectives of numerous different advantage ethicists and advantage epistemologists. Baehr additionally presents chapter-length analyses of 2 person personality virtues (open-mindedness and highbrow braveness) and an appendix at the relation among highbrow virtues and ethical virtues. total, the publication is a entire and groundbreaking therapy of a huge state of the art subject in philosophy.
Read Online or Download The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology PDF
Similar epistemology books
The worth of real trust has performed a crucial position in historical past of philosophy—consider Socrates’ slogan that the unexamined existence isn't really worthy dwelling, and Aristotle’s declare that everybody obviously wishes knowledge—as good as in modern epistemology, the place questions about the worth of information have lately taken middle degree.
2009 reprint of 1925 variation. this can be a major ebook of 1 inspiration, yet that concept is a crucial one for the social scientist. in line with the writer "many idea methods and suggestion constructs seem to be consciously fake assumptions, which both contradict fact or are even contradictory in themselves, yet that are deliberately hence shaped on the way to conquer problems of inspiration by means of this man made deviation, and succeed in the objective of idea through roundabout methods and via paths.
Caring for oneself is more and more interpreted as caring for one’s mind. except drugs, books, foodstuff, and video games for a greater mind, humans may also use neurotechnologies for self-improvement. This publication explores how using mind units to appreciate or enhance the self alterations people’s subjectivity.
- Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays
- Systems Thinking, Systems Practice: Includes a 30-Year Retrospective
- The Nature of Truth
- After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method
- Causal Asymmetries
- Kant's Metaphysic Of Experience - Vol II
Additional resources for The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology
Suppose, then, that person A believes that her careless disposal of cigarette butts is the cause of a wildﬁre that has begun raging in the hills just behind her house. In a moment of desperation and appalling moral judgment, A decides to plant evidence around her neighbor B’s house and yard indicating that B is responsible for the ﬁre. A detective is then dispatched to ascertain the cause of the blaze. He proceeds to conduct an intellectually virtuous investigation of the case. His work is motivated by a desire for truth and other virtuous ends.
24 Again, I am not denying that intellectual skills are often accompanied by something like a love of truth or 23 This does not mean that this person is “worth more” or possesses a greater fundamental dignity than someone who lacks the relevant virtues. For more on this point, and on the concept of “personal worth,” see Chapter 6. 24 The point here need not be made in terms of personal worth. For instance, on Zagzebski’s (1996) account of virtue, which makes no appeal to personal worth as such, the lack of a motivational requirement on intellectual skills would also prevent them from qualifying as intellectual virtues.
But the limitation of such a reply should be obvious: it provides an entirely negative and therefore unilluminating explanation of the relevant relation. Indeed, Zagzebski herself says that an appeal to the notion of non-accidentality in the context of addressing the Gettier problem is objectionably uninformative (264). It appears, then, that without considerable further elaboration and explanation, Zagzebski’s virtue-based analysis of knowledge does not provide an adequate solution to the Gettier problem.